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EDITORIAL.
QUALIFICATIONS TO PRACTICE
LAW.
Why should the tests of fitness to practice law vary with the different counties?
Should the lawyer not be as learned in
Cumberland as in Pittsburg or Philadelphia? The State-is'not so large, nor the
educational, social and industrial condition
of its parts so unequal, that any good reason
can be discovered for insisting in one
county on a different qualification from
that which obtains in another. There
ought to be uniformity.
That uniformity cannot be achieved by
the separate action of the different courts
is reasonably apparent. The Bar Association recommends a plan of study, but it
has, as yet, no sufficient authority to cause
its suggestions to be adopted in more than
a comparatively small portion of the State.
Even when the judges befriend the recommendations, they in some instances meet
with obstacles offered by the sentiment
of the bars, which are practically insurmountable.
Besides, to nominally adopt in all the
counties the same scheme of study and
examination, is by no means to secure uniformity of qualification. The value of
every law or ordinance depends on the
manner of its administration. The bar
committees of the different counties differ
vastly in the scholarship, the seriousness,

the loftiness of ideal, the public-spiritedness and industry of their members. Some
committees are unwilling to effectually
examine on the curriculum proposed, and
others are unable. There are some bars of
the State that would find it difficult, if not
impossible, to discover among their members gentlemen competent to apply intelligently and judiciously the criteria prescribed by the Bar Association. We have
found nowhere any indication of a willingness to call to their aid the more learned
or experienced membersof other bars than
their own. To put on paper an elaborate
scheme of study, without furnishing a
commission able and disposed to see that
it has been adequately pursued by candidates, is delusive. The character of the
scheme recommended makes it entirely
clear that in many counties of the State if
it be in form adopted, it will in practice
be substantially ignored. There can be
little doubt that the demand for reform in
law preparation will prove spasmodic, and
that if permanent effects are to be secured, a plan, unalterable by local caprice,
and administered by a durable commission
app6inted by some central body, and sitting for the entire State, must be established.
Constitutional objections to 'such a plan
are illusory. The Legislature can prescribe
qualifications for the various vocations.
It has already prescribed some for attorneys. We have never heard the authority
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of the act of April 14, 1834, disputed; and
we heartily concur in the observation of
the editor of Pepper and Lewis' Digest. 1
P. &. L. 225, that there is no valid objection
on constitutional grounds to such legislation.
Why should not the Supreme Court be
empowered to appoint a board of examiners
for the State, to be compensated by fees
paid by applicants for examination? Able
men might be thus secured, and a really
high and consistently administered standard of fitness might thus be secured. The
objections to such a commission are
founded on the objections to uniformity
and adequacy of qualifications., These desired, we think no other plan will accomplish them.

Julian C. Walker is following his profession at Wilmington, Del.

THE SCHOOL.
Spring fever cometh apace.
A. T. Morgan, '98, accompanied the Glee
Club and Orchestra on their recent trip to
Williamsport.
The Junior Class has begun the study of
the subject of Insurance under Judge Sadler.

ALUMNI PERSONALS.

The heirs of J. Herman Bosler, among
whom is J. Kirk Bosler, '99, have decided
to donate a library to the borough of Carlisle, in memory of their father. Work
is to be begun on the building at an early
date.

V. M. Henderson, '94, who is practicing
successfully at Huntingdon, Pa., recently
paid a brief visit to Carlisle.

The class of '97 are contemplating holding a reunion in Carlisle during Commencement week.

It gave us pleasure to see Isaac Wingert,
'97, in Carlisle over Easter Sunday.

Many of the students took advantage of
the short Easter vacation to visit their
homes.

Grant W. Nitraner, '95, is meeting with
much success in Lebanon, where he is
practicing. He has been elected attorney
for the commissioners.
The law firm of Fortney & Walker.
Bellefonte, has taken up its quarters in
the offices formerly occupied by Spangler
& Hewes, as the latter firm has retired
from practice at the Centre county bar,
and transferred all its cases, claims, etc.,
to the former.
Richard J. Goodall, '96, is enjoying a
good practice in Tyrone.
George T. Brown, '97, is practicing in
Freeland, Pa.
We learn that J. Wilmer Fisher, '96, is
doing well in his practice at Reading.
Willis E. Mackey, '97, who is practicing
in Altoona, has removed his offices to the
Masonic Temple.

G. Fred. Vowinckle, '98, was recently
elected President of the Senior Class, vice
Fred. B. Moser, resigned.
Ralph H. Light, '98, hasbeen appointed
Chairman of the Commencement Committee of the Senior Class, vice Charles E.
Daniels, resigned.
Much enthusiasm has been aroused in
the school on the subject of base-ball.
Heretofore the Law School has taken very
little interest in athletics, but at a large
meeting, held April 11th, an athletic association was formed and a base-ball team
organized. G. Fred. Vowinelde, '98, was
elected manager of the team.
The Glee Club left on Friday for their
Spring tour. They will sing in Steelton,
Lancaster, Wilmington, Dover, Milford,
Norfolk, Baltimore, and other places.
Two members ofthe Senior Class are now
sitting as judges in the various cases tried
in the Moot Court. An appeal from their
decision may be taken to Dean Trickett,
who sits as Judge of the Supreme Court.
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This is most excellent practice for the
Seniors, and adds interest to the court proceedings.

The Delta Chi Fraternity held a banquet
-ittheir chapter house Friday evening,
March 2.th, in honor of 0. G. McCandless,
'99, who left school to engage in business
at Butler, Pa. The rooms of the chapter
house were handsomely decorated.
Post-prandial toasts were responded to
by A. J. Feight, Robert H. Barker, Chas.
E. Daniels, Fred. B. Moser, Herman M.
Sypherd, G. Fred. Vowinckle, Charles G.
M(oyer, Chas. E. Shalters, A. Frank John,
W. K. Shissler, Martin Wolf, D. Edward
Long, Clarence R. Gilliland and 0. G.
McCandless.
The contract for the invitations to the
Commencement exercises of the Class of
'98 has been given to Chas. Elliott & Co..
Philadelphia. The design selected meets
the approval of all, both for its beauty and
neatness.
THE DICKINSON SOCIETY.
Owing to the inter-society debate in
Bosler Hall on Friday evening, March
18th, the society adjourned after receiving
Mr. Geo. L. Schuyler, of Milton, Pa., into
membership.
The society held an exciting meeting on
Friday evening, March 25th, when the
following officers, to serve for the ensuing
quarter, were elected :
President-Fred. C. Miller.
Vice President-Geo. W. Aubrey.
Secretary-Miss Julia A. Radle.
Treasurer-G. Washington Betson.
Sergeant-at-Arms-Dr. Jno.C. D. Davis.
Prothonotary-Eli Saulsbury.
Recorder-Walter T. Henry.
Register of Wills-Frank 3. Laubenstein.
Justice of the Peace-B. Frank Fenton.
Sheriff-Win. A. Jordan.
District Attorney-Geo. L. Schuyler.
Clerk of Court-Isaiah Scheeline.
At the meeting on April 2d the members indulged in impromptu speeches on
different subjects, which were of great
benefit to all present. A resolution was
passed directing the secretary to convey
to President McKinley, 'That it is the
sense of the Dickinson Society that the

United States should declare war against
Spain." The resolution was greeted with
overwhelming applause, which, with the
speeches that followed, plainly showed
that the students are not only fully alive
to the critical situation which at present
confronts the country, but have formed
judgments which were later practically
affirmed by the law-making bodies at
Washington.
Dr. Morris W. Prince, who occupies the
chair of History and Political Economy at
Dickinson College, spoke before the society
on Friday evening, April 15th, on "PersorialRecollectionsofJohn GreenleafWhittier." Dr. Prince is a man of culture and
wide learning, and is acquainted with
many of the prominent figures in the
American history of this generation. His
address was clothed in the most charming
language, bolding the attention of his
hearers closely until he finished, when the
society accorded him a unanimous vote of
thanks, and a hearty invitation to come
again.
THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
On March 30, 1898, the Allison Society
elected the following officers for the remaining quarter:
President-Ruel U. Capewell.
Vice President-Herman lM. Sypherd.
Secretary-J. Perry Wood.
Treasurer-Charles G. Moyer.
District Attorney-Adair Herman.
Sheriff-Walter B. Freed.
Prothonotary-Merkel Landis.
Justice of the Peace-Jackson 0. Haas.
Executive Committee-Charles E. Daniels, J. R. Smith and Ohas. McJveans.
Auditors-J. K. Bosler and Charles E.
Shalters.
The past quarter, under the administration of Charles E. Daniels as President of
the society, closed with much credit due
him and the staff of officers for so ably
supporting the society.
Wednesday evening, April 6th, was
memorable for one of the best and most
beneficial literary programs that has been
given for some time, which speaks well
for the society for the coming term. A
general discussion on the subject, "Besolved, That the President of the United
States should have power to declare war,"
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was entered into by all members present,
the discussion being opened by Walter B.
Freed and J. Perry Wood for the affirmative, and by G. H. Moyer and MIerkel
Landis for the negative. There was a
large attendance.
It is the object of the Executive Committee to furnish programs more of a literary character for the future, in order to
meet the demand, and give to the students
that which they are most in need of, and
at the same time furnish entertainment.

MOOT COURT.
SARAH ROSS vs. SAMUEL WILLISTON.
Conveyance by an habitual drunkard-M1ade after inquisition-Marriage settlement-Title acquired at an Oiphans'
Courtsale-Estoppel.
Ejectment.
MARTIN R.

HERR and SYLVESTER B.

SADLER for the plaintiff.
The inquisition should be only prima
.fr,cie evidence in regard to subsequent acts
which it was not intended to control.-Sill
v. McKnight, 7W. & S. 246. Where one
after inquisition does business, works and
gives receipts for wages, he will be bound.
-Black's Estate, 132 Pa. 134; Clark on
Contracts, 267; Hoopes' Estate, 174 Pa.
373. Where the lunatic during sane moinents has provided that his wife shall
stay in the house, the court will not allow
the committee to sustain ejeetment against
her.-Shaffer v. List, 114 Pa. 486. The
court will do what it is reasonable to believe the lunatic would do if he had capacity.-Potter v. Berry, 53 N. J. Eq. 151.
CLEON N.
BERNTHEIZEL and CLAUDE
L. ROTH for the defendant.
The deed to plaintiff is void.-Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen et al., 8 N. Y. 388;
Imhoffv. Witmer'sExrs., 31 Pa. 243; Yaple vs. Titus et al., 41 Pa. 195; Tozer v.
Saturlee, 3 Gr. 162; Black's Estate, 132
Pa. 134.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John Ross was on the 3d day of April,
1892, declared an habitual drunkard by
the Court of Common Pleas, and a committee of his person and property was appointed. Six months afterwards he contracted with Sarah Cooper that if she
would marry him, he would convey to her
a certain house with its furniture. She
assented, the conveyance was made on the
following day, and the next succeeding

day the marriage was solemnized. Ross
was perfectly sober when the contract was
made, and had been for a week before, and
continued so for two weeks after. On the
11th of June, 1895, the committee applied
for leave from the Common Pleas to sell
the house for the purpose of paying the
debts of the drunkard and of supporting
him. The court granted leave, and a publip sale was had. On this sale the wife
gave notice that she was the owner. The
effect of this notice and claim was to deter
persons from bidding, and to cause a sale
for but $1,500 of a home that, had not the
title been questioned, would have brought
$5,000. The sale was confirmed by the
court, despite the objection of the wife that
the house was her's. Twelve hundred dollars of the proceeds were applied to debts,
and of the residue a weekly sum of eight
dollars was applied to Ross and wife for
the period of thirteen weeks. Then this
ejectment was brought by Sarah Ross
against Samuel Williston, the purchaser
at the sale of the committee.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

In October, 1892, John Ross conveyed
his house and furniture to the woman who,
the following day, was to become his wife.
Subsequently to the l1th of June, 1895, the
sale of the same house, as the property of
John Ross, was made to Samuel Williston.
The title thus acquired by him was manifestly bad, if the previous sale was valid.
At the time of the previous sale John Ross
was a habitual drunkard. He, however,
had not lost all control of himself, for he
had been sober for a week before, and continued sober two weeks after the conveyance. The cases are very numerous which
hold that although one is even found by
an inquest to have been a habitual drunkard, his contracts and conveyances made
before the inquisition, but within the period of this habitual drunkenness, will be
valid, if, at the time of their making, the
party was in fact sober. -Miskey's Appeal,
107 Pa. 611; Sill v. MpKnight, 7 W. &. S.
244; in re Gangwere's Estate, 14 Pa. 56;
Rodgers v. Walker, 6 Pa. 371; Klohs v.
Klohs, 61 Pa. 245. Theauthorities in other
States to the same effect are numerous.Van Deusen v. Sweet, 51 N. Y. 378; Dixon
v. Dixon, 22 N. J. Eq. 91. Had the conveyance to Sarah Ross not been preceded
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by an inquisition finding John Ross a
habitual drunkard, it would be unimpeachable.
But, six months before the conveyance
to Sarah Ross, John had been found to be
a habitual drunkard. The effect of such
inquisition is not indeed to divest the ownership of the drunkard of his personal and
real property, but generally to destroy his
right of alienation of it. The court assumes control of ill his property, the committee being its bailiff or servant-Shaffer
v. List, 114 Pa. 486; Yaple v. Titus, 41 Pa.
195; and the drunkard's dispositive power
is in general superseded. Not only may
he not directly sell his property of any
kind; he cannot make contracts whose enforcement would indirectly deprive him
of his property. Thus, he cannot, after
inquisition, revive a note barred by the
statute of limitations-Hannum's Appeal,
9 Pa. 471; nor waive notice of nonpayment
and protest of a bill of exchange which he
had endorsed before the inquisitionWadsworth v. Sharpsteen, 8 N. Y. 388;
nor make a valid bond-L' Amoureux v.
Crosby, 2 Paige Ch. 422; Imhoff v. Witmer, 31 Pa. 243; or mortgage-Fay v. Burdett, 81 Ind. 433; or grant of land-Wait
v. Maxwell, 5 Peck 217. In Griswold v.
Butler, 3 Conn. 227, a conveyance by the
habitual drunkard, consented to by the
conservator (committee), but not authorized by the court, was held void-Cf.
Griswold v. Miller, 15 Barb. 524. The dispositive faculty is not altogether in abeyance, however. The drunkard under guardianship may, when sober, make a willLeckey v. Cunningham, .56 Pa. 370;
Thompson's Appeal, 174 Pa. 373. He may
earn wages by manual work, l)erformcd
while under guardianship, and a payment
to him, instead of the committee, by the
person for whom the work is done, will be
a valid discharge Black's Estate, 132 Pa.
134. He may even execute, as an executor, a power to convey land of the testator
-Sill v. McKnight, 7 V. & S. 244, because
it is not the purpose of the act, which provides for commissions on drunkards, to
deprive them of control of other property
than their own.
The conveyance of John Ross to Sarah
was in execution of the marriage contract
between them. Himself, alone, she did
not find eligible. When, in addition to

himself, he offered his house and furniture,
she consented to accept him The conveyance was accordingly made, and the
marriage followed. Is the marriage contract valid? In marriage, the husband
disposes of himself. He also imposes burdens on his property. He becomes bound
to support his wife. For necessaries furnished to her, he neglecting to furnish
them, would be responsible.
The marriage also embarrasses his disposition of
his land, on account of the dower which
she acquires therein. Is, then, a marriage
by a drunkard, under guardianship, void?
It is valid. Imhoff v. Witmer, 31 Pa. 243.
But, if the marriage is assented to by the
woman only in consideration of the man's
reciprocal assent to take her and to convey
to her land, may she, after she has taken
both him and the land, be deprived of the
latter, and not of the former? So it seems.
Imhoffv. Witmer, 31 Pa. 243. That case
holds the marriage good, and the bond
given to her for $500, payable at the husband's death, to induce her to marry,
void. The grantor's defect of power makes
his deed to Mrs. Ross inoperative.
As the plaintiff in an ejectment must
recover by means of his own good title, and
not of the bad title of the defendant, it is
unnecessary to consider whether the sale
to Samuel Williston was -valid, unless
Sarah Ross has a right to recover should
that sale be bad. As grantee from her
husband, she has no right to recover. Has
she as wife? Were she in possession, perhaps the committee could not dispossess
her by ejectment, without leave of the
court-Shaffer v. List, 114 Pa. 486. But
she is not in possession. The right to the
possession inheres in him who has the ownership. There is no point of view from
which she may recover.
It was vigorously maintained at the argument that even if Mrs. Ross obtained a
good title by the conveyance from her husband, she has estopped herself from asserting it by accepting some of the proceeds of
the court sale of the laud. Of these proceeds, $1,200 were applied to the drunkard's debts. "Of the residue, a weekly
sum of $8 was applied to Ross and wife for
the period of 13 weeks." The $1,500 paid
by Williston were paid for the interest of
John Ross in the house. He was warned
by Sarah Ross that she claimed it. He
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paid less than one-third of the value of the
house, because of this competing claim.
The money he paid belonged to John Ross.
He was legally bound to support his wife.
So much of the $8 as was paid to her was
paid to her as wife. It would otherwise
have been paid to him, and he would have
expended it for her. We seeno elementof
estoppel in these facts.
The extraordinarily complete and able
brief of one of the counsel for the plaintiff,
and of one for the defendant, have greatly
facilitated the labor of the court in the investigation of this case, and we desire to
express our satisfaction for the aid so generously given to us.
We see no cause for disturbing the verdict for the defendant, and the motion for
a new trial is accordingly overruled.

The cestui que trust has not the right of
possession,-Sim's Estate, 130 Pa. 451;
Hutchinson's Appeal, 82 Pa. 509. Nor
can he mortgage his interest.-27 Am. and
Eng. Encyc. 235, 236; 2 Por. Eq. 1003;
Vaux v. Parke, supra; Penna. Co. v. Foster, 35 Pa. 134; Craig v. Leslie, 16 U. S. 563.
4. The beneficiary could not validate the
mortgage by ratification, as he was not an
infant when it was given.-Clark on Contracts, p. 247.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Win. G. Horsey left a will, containing
the following: I give and devise to my
grandson, William Blackiston, all that
farm I purchased of William Alford. I
do further appoint John Horsey, trustee
of William Blackiston, to take charge and
exercise control of all the property devised
by me to William Blackiston, said trusteeship to continue until said William Blackiston is twenty-five years of age, and no
GEO. DEAKYNE vs. JOHN HOLMES.
longer. Said John Horsey is to receive no
Trst- Words necessary to create-Equi- commission for the discharge of the duties
table estatefor years and fee in remain- of said trust. Should he fail to accept, he
der in same person-Power to alienate shall annually, during Blackiston's mir mainder during the continuanceof the nority, pay to him $100 from the property
estatefor years.
heretofore devised by me to him (Horsey).
This provision is intended to make said
Distribution of proceeds.
trust effective. And I do further direct
CLARENCE, R. GILLILAND and HERMAN
M. SYPHERD for the plaintiff
that Horsey shall expend from the reve1. Equitable interests maybe conveyed.
niies of said William Blackiston's property
-Rogers v. Colt, 21 N. J. L. 704; Lewis v.
sufficient for his education and other needHawkins, 0 .U. S. 119; Bramhall v. Ferful purposes. Blackiston became twentyris, 14 N. Y. 41; Debrell v. Carlisle, 51
one March 26, 1893. He executed a mortMiss. 785.
2. A mortgage is a sale upon condition.gage on the above described land, on April
Patterson v. Robinson, 25 Pa. 81; Harley
11, 1894, to George A. Deakyne. Subsev. Carey, 73 Pa. 431.
quently several judgments were recovered
3. Blackiston could mortgage his future
legal interest -Butt v. Elletf, 86 U. S. 544; against him-three between March 26,
Shaw v. Bill, 95 U. S. 10; P. W. & B. R.
1893, and March 26, 1897. A judgment of
R. v. Woelpper, 64 Pa. 366; Andrees' Est., John Holmes was recovered on April 16,
14 Phila. 240; Bailey v. Allegheny Bank,
1897. A sheriff's sale of the farm on the
104 Pa. 425.
4. The perfection of the title in Blackis- judgment was made. (First mortgages
ton inures to the mortgagee.-Clark v.
not being saved from discharge byjudgMartin, 9 Pa. 299; Dentler's Appeal, 23
ment sales in the State where the land is.)
Pa. 505; Massey v. Papin, 165 U. S. 362;
The mortgagee and the judgment creditors
Penrose v. Griffith, 4 Binney 231; Coinclaim the proceeds.
stock v. Smith, 30 Mass. 119.
ELI SAULSBURY

and ORIGEN G.

MC-

CANDLESS for the defendant.
1. The intention was to preclude alienation, and this intention must be sustained.
-Ruston v. Ruston, 2 Dall. 243; Williams'
Appeal, 83 Pa 377; Ogden's Appeal, 70
Pa. 507; Vaux v. Parke, 7 W. & S. 25.
2. The trust cannot fail.-Leggett v.
Hunter, 19 N. Y. 445.
3. The trust vests the fee in the trustee.
-Barnett's Appeal, 46 Pa. 401; Shankland's Appeal, 47 Pa. 113; Deibert's Appeal, 78 Pa. 296; Earp's Appeal, 75 Pa. 119.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The first question to be considered is,
was a trust created by the will of William
G. Horsey in the land devised to his grandson, William Blackiston, until the attainment by the latter of his twenty-sixth year
of age?
The devise is not to John Horsey in trust
for Blackiston, but to Blackiston. But
this circumstance is not decisive. The
powers conferred on Horsey may be such
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as to indicate that he takes the land as
trustee-27 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 35.
Though the land is given directly to the
beneficiary, "the trust may be necessarily
inferred from the power and authority conferred on the executors, and thus, from the
construction of the entire will, the intention may be shown that the executors are
to take the legal title as trustees of an express active trust."-2 Pomeroy Eq. P10 11;
Tobias v. Ketchum, 32 N. Y. 319. In
Sheets' Estate, 52 Pa. -57, the language of
the will was: "I give and bequeath the
whole of my estate, real, personal .*
0 to my sons *
* and to my daughters **
* all which shall be invested by my executors *
*
*

and the interest of the money.so invested,
as well as the rents, issues and profits of
my real estate, shall be paid over to my
said children annually during their respective lives." In deciding that these
words created a trust, Strong, J. said: "To
determine whether there is a trust we are
to look, not at the title given, but at the
powers and duties conferred. There is no
magic in the word trustee. No particular
form of words is necessary to make a trust.
*
*
*
s The dutieg imposed, and
the powers given to the executor in the
will now before us, are such as necessarily
to constitute him .a trustee." In Vaux v.
Parke, 7 W. & S.19, there was, first, a devise of land to a son, and then, in a later
part of the will, to a trustee for him. In
Smith v. Savidge, 4 Penny. 320, there was
a trust, although the property was bequeathed directly to the beneficiary.
Do the words of the will, with regard to
John Horsey, indicate that he is made a
trustee? "I do further appoint John Horsey trustee of William Blackiston." His
function is calleda "'trust" and a I'trusteeship." He is "to take charge and exercise
control of all the property devised'" to
Blackiston; he is to "expend from the
revenues of said William Blackiston's
property sufficient for his education and
other needful purposes." The "trusteeship is to continue until said William
Blackiston is twenty-five years of age, and
no longer." Here is, in substance, a bestowal on Horsey of the control, of the
power to collect rents and profits; to determine what expenditures therefrom shall
be made for the education and mainte-

nance of Blackiston-Cf. Stambaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. 585. In Kay v. Scates, 37
Pa. 31, the trustee was to collect the rents
and profits, and pay to the beneficiaries
such money for their support and education as he deemed prorer and expedient,
and when they reached the age of twentyfive was-to piay to them the whole of the
income. It was held that the trust was
active until the beneficiaries became twenty-five years of age, but thereupon became
passive. A trust for one, until he reaches
a certain age, is therefore permissible, and
will be enforced.-Cf. Ward's Estate, 13
W. N. C. 282.
Nor is it necessary that the legal estate
succeeding the trust should be vested in
another than the beneficiary of the trust.
The trust may be in favor of him who, at
its close, is to acquire the legal estate in
fee by conveyance from the trustee.Ward's Estate, supra; Kay v. Scates, supra. The testator in the case before the
court devised the farni in fee to Blackiston.
He then imposed a trust on the fee, until
the completion of Blackiston's twentyfifth year. The effect of the arrangement
was to give him an equitable estate in the
land for a term of years, with a vested
legal remainder in fee.
Blackiston executed a mortgage upon
the land devised to him on April 11, 1894,
thirteen months after he had gained his
majority, and nearly three years before the
trust expired by his attainment of the age
of twenty-five. Is this mortgage valid?
The mortgage did not operate upon the
equitable interest. Certain equitable interests may be aliened, but when the trust
is to furnish periodic sums of money for
the education or maintenance of the cestui
que trust, he cannot alien his interest in
it.-Forey's Appeal, 106 Pa. 508. Did the
mortgage bind the legal estate in remainder? A vested remainder may be aliened
by one who has not an equitable interest
in the particular estate which precedes it,
"by any form known to the law which
does not require a formal livery of seizin,
or passing of actual possession."--2 Washburn, Real Prop., 553 (Ed. of 1876). In
Forey's Appeal, 106 Pa. 508, property was
held in trust for the support of a widow
during life, and at her death for others.
During her life the remaindermen made a
valid conveyance of the interest.
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There is a class of cases in which the
same person may have the legal fee in remainder and the preceding equitable particular estate. Land may be given to a
married woman in fee, for her sole and
separate use. The trust continues during
coverture, and drops away immediately
upon discoverture. It is well known that
during the existence of the trust she has
no power of alienation, unless it was expressly conferred by the instrument which
created the estate. Hays v. Leonard, 155
Pa. 475. Her deed, made during coverture, would operate neither on the trust
estate, as the estate during the coverture,
nor on the legal remainder. Henice, her
devise of such a remainder is invalid.Steinmetz's Estate, 168 Pa. 175. Such a
devise, or a conveyance, would be made
under the influence of the husband, and
the policy of courts of equity, in creati ng
the "sole and separate use," has been to
prevent any alienation which might be
superinduced by his persuasion or coercion. The object of the Horsey trust is to
secure the support and education of Blackiston until he is twenty-five years old. It
follows, as we have seen, that no alienation that would prevent that object
is allowable. But, does the trust make
the future interest inalienable while it
exists? We have made a rather careful
search, and have found no instance in
which the courts have held that the power
to convey the future estate is suspended
by such a trust. The legal remainder in
Blackiston is a fee, and the law is averse
to the inalienability of fees. But whether
it would permit a suspension of the power
of alienation of a legal estate in remainder
on a limited trust, if the instrument creating the trust expressly withheld that
power, we think it would be necessary
that that instrument should clearly withhold the power. The Horsey will does not
expressly withhold the power, nor does
the object of the trust manifested in it require the preservation of the estate for
Blackiston longer than the completion of
his twenty-fifth year. The law creates an
incapacity to convey land during minority.
If the testator designed to prolong this incapacity, with respect to the land devised,
his purpose should be distinctly manifested.

It follows that the fund must be distributed to the heirs in their order.
THOMAS REYNOLDS vs. AMOS

DUDLEY.
Contracts to perform work on SundaylVorks of charity.
Assumpsit.

MISS JULIA A. RADLE and WALTER J.
HENRY for the plaintiff.
1. Sacred concerts are not prohibited by
the Act 1794. To avoid recovery, the defendant must establish violation of the Act
affirmatively.-Johnson v. Coin:, 22 Pa.
102 ; Coin. v. Nesbit, 34 Pa. 398 ; Com. v.
Myers, 8 C. Ct. 439.
2. Statutes permit works of necessity on
Sunday.-Com. v. Fuller, 4. C. Ct. 429;
Flagg v. Inhab. of Millbury, 4 Cush. 243.
3. As to plaintiff's right to recover, see
Feightal v. R. 1. Co., 109 Mass. 398;
Gregg v. Wyman, 4 Cush. 326; Hadley v.
Sneively, 1 W. & S. 477; Adams v. Grey,
154 Pa. 250; White v. Franklin Bank, 2
Pick. 181 ; Lowell v. P. R. Co., 23 Pick.
24; Concord v. Delaney, 58 Mie. 316.
Go. W. COLES and LLEWELLYN Hi,DRETH for defendant.
1. Secular business prohibited on Sunday.-Act April 22, 1794; Coin. v. Knorr,
4 C. Ct. 32; Kepner v. Keefer, 6 Watts
231 ; Com. v. Johnston, 22 Pa. 102 ; Coin.
v. Seaman, 11 W. N. C. 15.
2. This action being oin a contract, in
violation of d statute, cannot be maintained.-Mayborn v. Conlon, 4 Yeates 34;
Mitchell v. Smith, 1 Binn. 118; Grange
v. Grubb, 7 Phila. 350.
3. A promise to do several indivisible
acts, some of which are illegal, cannot be
enforced.-Crawford v. Morrell, 8 Johns.
(N. Y.) 195; Thayer v. Rock, 13 Wend.
53.
4. A contract made on some other day
to do work on Sunday is illegal.-Clark
on Cont. 394; Coin. v. Reese, 10 C. Ct.
545 ; Coin. v. Waldnan, 8 C. Ct. 449.
5. Money paid on an illegal contract cannot be recovered.-Myers v. Meinrath, 101
Mass. 366; Horton v. Buffinton, 105 Mass.
399.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Dudley, proprietor and operator of a
popular mountain resort, contracted with
Reynolds, that he, Reynolds, and his band(
of five persons should furnish daily concerts during the month of August, and
should receive for each man $25 per week
of seven days. Nothing was said about
the character of the music on Sundays.
Before the arrival of the first Sunday it
was agreed that on that day sacred, patriotic, and other music of the more serious

THE FORUM.
character, should be performed, with a keeper to sell liquor to a guest-Omit v.
view to avoid shocking the sensibilities of Commonwealth, 21 Pa. 426; for a canalsuch ofthe guests as might have sabbata- boat pilot to pilot the boat-Scully v.
rian or other religious prejudices. The Commonwealth, 35 Pa. 511.; for a driver
object of Dudley in furnishing Sunday of an omnibus to drive it on Sundaymusic was precisely that of furnishing Johnston v. Commonwealth, 22 Pa. 102;
music on the other days of the week, viz.: for passenger cars to run on Sundayto please his guests, and to secure their Sparhawk v. Union Passenger Railway
patronage. In accordance with this later
Co., 54 Pa. 401; Commonwealth v. Jeanagreement, the Sunday music was com- dell, 2 Gr. 506; for a barber to shave on
posed of music ordinarily given in church,
Sunday-Conmonwealth v.Waldman, 140
and of the Star-Spangled Banner, Colum- Pa. 89. In all these cases the ordinary
bia the Gem of the Ocean, and other such
worldly work of Monday and Tuesday did
strains. Reynolds carried out hils contract, not cease to be "worldly employment or
upon which $200 are still due him. For business" when done on Sunday.
this sum he maintains this assumpsit.
Music, especially sacred and patriotic, is
No obstacle to a recovery by Reynolds educative, refining and ennobling. So is
is suggested other than the Act of April
the study of art or literature; of astronomy
22, 17,4, 2 P. & L. 4406. This act makes or botany. But, if the conductor of a
it a finable offense to "do or perform any school of art or science carried it on on
worldly employment or business whatso- Sundays, as well as on weekdays, we do
ever on the Lord's day, commonly called
not suspect that it would occur to him to
Sunday, works of necessity and charity allege that it was not his "worldly emonly excepted." It specifies also several
ployment or business."exceptions, such as the dressing of victuals
But, the Act of 1794 excepts from the
in private families, lodging houses, etc.
"worldly employment or business" that
The contract between Reynolds and
it prohibits "works
of necessity or
Dudley was not made on Sunday, but it
charity." Was the furnishing of music
contemplated the furnishing of music on
by Reynolds such a work?
Sunday. If such furnishing was a perWas it a charity? Had the object of
formance of worldly business or employ- Dudley been to make the guests happy, to
ment, and was not a work of necessity or elevate their sentiments, to enkindle their
charity, it was prohibited by this act, and imaginations, to awaken spiritual and
the contract for it was a contract for an
patriotic emotions, for their sakes, for the
illegal thing. It would follow that for his sake of God or country, the concert might
performance of this illegal thing Reynolds
be esteemed a work of charity. It is not
could not recover compensation.-Clark
necessary that the musicians should have
Contracts, 470, et passim; Stewart v. had this motive. Their motive might be
Thayer, 168 Mass. 519; Stevens v. Wo6d,
entirely mundane and personal, and yet
127 Mass. 123.
if the object in Dudley's procuring from
Reynolds and his band were musicians
them the music was disinterested and beby profession. They earned their living nevolent, this object would reflect its
by music. Their motive in contracting character upon the acts of the band, and
to furnish this music was the same as in
their performance would be, from the legal
contracting to furnish any other, viz. : to -point of view, a work of charity. The
get the compensation. The concerts given service of the church sexton, of the organby them, were, we think, from their point
ist, of the preacher, may be performed by
of liew, worldly employment or business.
them, with a perfectly sordid motive, for
For a musician to furnish music for pay
pay, for reputation and for honor. But if
on Sunday is no less to do worldly work the church organization that hires them
than for an editor or newsdealer to furnish has as its object not gain to itself, but good
a newspaper- Commonwealth v. MAatto the community., their work would be a
thews, 152 Pa. 166; Commonwealth v. work of charity. "Contracts," says MerHouston. 14 Pa. C. C. 395 ; for a farmer to cur J., "for services on Sunday of the
spread fertilizers on his land-Specht v. preacher, the sexton, the organist and the
Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312; for an inn- .singers, are not illegal, although these per-
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sons may engage in such employments as
a means of livelihood. Their services are
in furtherance of the same great charity.'
-Dale v. Knepp, 98 Pa. 389. A corporation that operates a college for gain to itselfthough its teaching would bear exactly
the same character as that of one which
did not seek gain, would not, while the
latter would, be a charity. As Dudley
furnished the music, not from a charitable
motive, but out of an enlightened policy
for the sake of gain to himself, we can
hardly call his act a work of charity.
Is it a work of necessity? Few things
could be regarded, with any strictness, as
necessary, and the term has a considerable
elasticity of meaning.-Commonwealth v.
Gillespie, 146 Pa. 546. Mr. Dudley maintained a mountain resort. It was his duty
to furnish them with proper accommodations. In some respects, he was the head
of a large household, obliged to furnish
food, heat, service of various sorts. In the
selection of viands, he had a large discretion. It would be impracticable to apply
an inflexible test to determine what Sunday service was indispensable, what cooking, what sweeping, washing, etc., were
avoidable. Tastes and consciences differ
almost infinitely. What is necessary to
one man is an unappreciated superfluity
for another. To the day laborer a feast
would be royal that would not appeal
to the appetite of the pampered millionaire. Sojourners in a solitary mountain resort need amusements, which would
be wholly unnecessary at their usual
homes. As, on Sunday, the convictions
of many prevent the taking of recreations
that are open on weekdays, the proprietor
of the inn might well feel it incumbent on
him to give aesthetic and religious satisfaction to such people by means of music.
We do not see why music may not be as
necessary after dinner as ice cream or pie
at dinner; why it should not be as necessary to console and elevate the soul by
music as to amuse the senses by the numberless acts of service esteemed essential
in a well-appointed hotel. We do not see
how it is possible for the court to say that to
furnish Sunday music was not a work of
necessity. Only the jury could decide this
question.-Commonwealth v. Gillespie,
146 Pa. 546. The jury has considered the

question, and has decided that the music
was necessary. We see no sufficient cause
to set aside their verdict.
JOHN NEWELL vs. JOHN SMITH
ET AL.

Right to vote-esidence in ward-Removal within two months previous to
election on account of fire--Liability of
election officer for rejecting vote.
Trespass.
FRED. B. MOSER and MILES H. M*RR
for the plaifitiff.
1. Every citizen has a right to vote in
the election district where he has his legal
residence.-Constitution of Pa., Art. 8, P1
and 13 ; Jacobs on Domicil, 53.
2. The original domicil is to prevail until the party not only bas acquired another
but has manifested and carried into execution an intention of abandoning his former
domicil, and taking another as his sole
domnicil.-Jacobs' Law of Domicil, 125,
126, 135, 136, 139, 140, 151, 159 and 162;
Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617; Fry's Election
Case, 71 Pa. 302 ; Lower Oxford Election
Case, 11 Phila. 641; Hindman's Appeal,
85 Pa. 466; Guier v. O'Daniel, I Binney
349 ; Follweiler v. Lutz, 112 Pa. 107 ; Carey's Appeal, 75 Pa. 201 ; Hood's Estate,
21 Pa. 1016; 13 C. C. 465.
3. Election officers are liable in damages
for rejecting the vote of any qualified
voter.-Ashby v. White, 1 Smith's Leading Cases 464; Blanchard v. Stearns, 46
Mass. 298; Lincoln v. Hapgood, 11 Mass.
350.
FRANCIS LAFFERTY and JACKSON ORLANDO HAAS for the defendants.
1. A person who has removed from one
ward to another within two months of an
election is not entitled to vote in either.Smull's Handbook for 1896, p. 587; 1
Brightly's Purdon's Dig. 732.
2. An election officer is not responsible
for rejecting a vote unless malice be alleged
and proven. - Morgan v. Rennard, 3
Brewst. 601; Weckerly et al. v. Geyer 11
S. & R. 35; Yealy et al. v. Fink, 43 iPa.
215; Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. 151; Jenkins v. Waldron, 11 Johns. 113. Malice
will not be presumed.-Burton v. Fulton,
49 Pa. 154.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On Jan. 4, 1898, the Commercial Hotel,
situate in the Second ward, of Mount Carmel borough, was destroyed by fire. Previous to its destruction about twenty
regular boarders and the proprietor made
it their home, and were registered as voters
of that ward. On aco,,'tr of the destruc-
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tion of the building the proprietor and
boarders were obliged to seek other quarters in the several different wards (suitable
ones not being obtainable in the Second
ward). These people have continued to
claim the Second ward as their residence,
and express their intention of returning to
it as soon as the hotel is rebuilt.
At the Spring election in said borough,
held Feb. 15, 1898, the above mentioned
proprietor and boarders, asserting their
right to vote in the Second ward, tendered
their ballots, which were rejected by the
election board of that ward. John Newell,
the proprietor, now brings this action
against John Smith et al., members of the
above mentioned election board, to recover
damages.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

John Newell alleges that John Smith
has deprived him of that to which he had
a right, viz.: a vote at the election held
on Feb. 15, 1898, in the borough of 3\t.
Carmel. Had he this right?
He had resided in the Second ward of
this borough. In the hotel therein situate
his family and lie abode. He was its proprietor. A fire, occurring on January 4,
1898, destroyed this hotel, and he was
compelled to find, and did find, an abode
for his family and himself in another ward
until the hotel should be rebuilt. To it he
intended to return as soon as it should be
rebuilt.
Article VIII of the Constitution of
Pennsylvania names the qualifications of
the voter. He must (1) be a citizen of the
United States one month; (2) "have resided in the State one year;" (3) "have
resided in the election district, where he
shall offer to vote, at least two months
immediately preceding the election ;" (4)
have paid a tax. He must, therefore, reside in the election district whei he offers
to vote. Did John Newell thus reside on
the 15th day of February, 1898 ?
He resided there, down to January 4th.
There is a presumption that he continues
to reside there, which those who deny his
continued residence must overcome.Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617 ; 5 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. 865, 870. A man may reside in a
place, though he is not personally present
there. He may go from his home on a
tour, may sojourn at the seashore, for days,
weeks or months, without losing his resi-

dence. He may even abandon the house,
which he has been occupying, and go to a
distant place, in search of a home, with
the intention not to reside in the neighborhood he has forsaken, without losing
his residence in that neighborhood. He
loses his residence there only when he begins a residence elsewhere.---Pfoutz v.
Comferd, 36 Pa. 420; Reed's Appeal, 71
Pa. 378; White v. Browne, 1 Wall C. C.
264. In Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617, departing from Brooklyn to West Chester, and remaining fifty-seven days
in West Chester, and dying there,
did not show a change of residence. In Malone v. Lindley, 1 Phila.
192, Sharswood P. J. writing the opinion,
X, formerly residing in New Jersey, renmained in Luzerne county a long time,
there carrying on business, paying taxes
and military fines, was held not to have
ceased to reside in New Jersey. Students
who go to a college town, and there remain for two or three years, do not ipso
facto cease to reside where they did before
they became students.-Fr3 -'. Election
Case, 71 Pa. 302; Lower Oxford Contested
Election, 11 Phila. 641.
In these cases all the usual outward
marks ofresidence pointed to another place
as the residence than that which was held
to be the residence. There was personal
presence, a place of shelter habitually
resorted to; proximity of personal belongings, participation in the social life of the
neighborhood. But there was no mental
detachment from the former abode. The
stay in the new place was intended to be
temporary, and a return to the former
place was kept in contemplation and purpose. In Price v. Price, supra, the purpose of A, who was sick, in coming to West
Chester, was to get better nursing, and,
when well, to return to Brooklyn. In
Malone v. Lindley there was the purpose
to return to New Jersey.
The cause of the departure from an abode
may cast light on the purpose. A sickness
may compel resort to a foreign land, or
business may drive one to a distant spot,
and the departure will be less indicative
than otherwise it would of a purpose to
abandon the former residence.-5 Am. &
Eng. Eneye. 879. The Commercial Hotel
was suddenly destroyed by fire. Flight
from it was compulsory. As there were

THE FORUM.
no eligible homes in the same ward, a sojourn in another became inevitable. tsuch
sojourn is very feeble evidence of An intention to quit the hotel longer than may be
necessary to re-erect it. Less than two
months intervened until the ballot of the
plaintiff was offered. Along continuance
in the Third ward would repel, probably,
any suggestion of an intention to return
to the Second ; buttheabode in the Third
ward for a few weeks was not long enough
to produce this result.
In all doubtful cases, and in many that
would not be doubtful, the purpose of the
person is decisive. Expressions of intention are important.-5 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
871; Price v. Price, 156 Pa. 617; Hindman's Appeal, 85 Pa. 466; Malone v.
Lindley, 1 Phila. 192. And acts, expressive of the purpose, may be shown,
such as permitting one's self to be taxed,
or voting.--Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn. 349.
It is shown that the plaintiff continued to
claim the Second ward as his residence,
and to assert the purpose to resume an
abode in it as soon as the hotel should be
rebuilt. The offer to vote is also a characteristic manifestation of intent.
One of tile consequences of holding that
the plaintiff had ceased to reside in the
Second ward would be to hold that, by an
occurrence beyond his control, he lost the
right of voting. Ol the day of the election he had clearly not resided two months
in the Third ward. The court will not be
astute to so interpret. his acts as to disfranchise him without his own consent. His
interference in Taird ward issues might
properly be deemed an intrusion. We
think he had still a right to speak through
the ballot on Secoud ward issues.
But, to decide that John Newell's vote
should have been received in the Second
ward is not equivalent, to deciding that he
must recover in this action against the
election officers. Apparently, there are
only two States which hold the doctrine
of the responsibility of such officers for refusing to receive the vote of a lawful voter,
without regard to their good faith. Those
States are Massachusetts and Ohio.
Tvelve other States hold to the impunity
of these officers, except when they have
acted willfully and maliciously.-Cooley,
Torts, p. 482, Ed. of 1888. In a few others,
the duty of these officers is purely minis-

terial, the voter being the final judge of
his right to vote, and entitling' himself
unconditionally, by filing a certain affidavit. In such States the election officers
are liable for an improper rejection of a
ballot, because they have no discretion.Ibid. Pennsylvania is ranked by Cooley
among the twelve States that confer upon
the election officers the immunity accorded
to judicial officers; on the authority of
Weckerley v. Geyer, 11 S. & R. 35. An
able opinion by Judge Butler adopts the
same view. Moran v. Rennard, 3 Brewst.
601. C'ses making analogous applications
of the principle are Burton v. Fulton, 49
Pa. 151 ; Yardley v. Fink, 43 Pa. 215.
It is not alleged that the defendant rejected the vote of the plaintiff maliciously.
His right to vote was fairly debatable.
The facts are not so clear as to exclude all
reasonable doubt as to what they are, or
as to their significance. Judgment of nonsuit must therefore be entered.
AMOS BOYD

vs.

JOSIAH

PONER

ET AL.

Replevin bond-Damages--BRefusaloftender of goods-Amendment.
ARTHUR M. DEVALL and FRANK H.
STROUSS for the plaintiff.
1. The bond is conditioned that the
obligor prosecute his suit with effect, and
make return of the goods, if such return
be adjudged. Breach of either condition,
works a torfeiture. Judgment de retorno
habendo is not necessary.-Bank v. Hall,
107 Pa. 583; Gibbs v. Bartlett, 2 W. & S.
29; Balsley v. Hoffman, 13 Pa. 603; Bank
v. Hyndman, 42 Leg. Int. 330; Tibbal v.
Cahoon, 10 Watts 236 ; Kimmel v. Kint, 2
Watts 431; Krumbhaar v. Stetler, 10 Pa.
C. C. 12.
2. Defendant may refuse a return of
goods when plaintiff in replevin has been
non-suited, and proceed upon the bond.Bank v. Hall, supra; Gibbs v. Bartlett,
supra; Bank v. Hyndman, supra.
3. Damages include award in replevin,
value of goods, damages for retention and
costs of suit.-Balsley v. Hoffman, suipra;
Tibbal v. Cahoon, supra; Millerv. Fontz,
2 Yeates 418.
CHARLES S. SHALTERS and HARRY M.

PERSING for the defendant.
1. Defendant in replevin must move for
a return of the goods before he can sue on
the bond.-Smalwood v. Norton, 20 Me.
83; Pettisgrove v. Hoyt, 11 Me. 66; Balsley v. Hoffman, 13 Pa. 611; Kimmel v.
Kint, 2 Watts 431.
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2. The action must be brought in the
name of the sheriff to the use of the party

de retorno habendo; or of an actual return
of the goods.-20 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1138.
beneficially interested.-Clark v. Morss,
Has the replevin been prosecuted with
14Z"Pa. 311; Balsley v. Hoffman, supra;
Tibbal v. Cahoon, J0 Watts 232; Bank v. effect?
Hall, 107 Pa. 583; McMichiel v. Harper,
Poner suffered a non-suit in the replevin.
1848 Ms. Dist. Court, Phila.; Fitler v.
He did not, then, prosecute it with effect.
Roberts, Ibid; Thompson v. Schofield,
-Berghoff v. Heckwolf, 26 Mo. 511 ; 20
1bid.
Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1138. If he had reAttorneys for the plaintiff then moved
for an amendment, substituting the sheriff covered a judgment, and this judgment
as plaintiff to the use of Amos Boyd, and
had been reversed by the Supreme Court
cited Act of May 4, 1852, 2 P. & L. 3632;
without a venirefacias de novo, he would
Act of March 21, 1806, 6; Leeds v.. Locknot have prosecuted the suit with effect.wood, 84 Pa. 73; Felty v. Deaven, 166 Pa.
640; Reber v. Wright, 68 Pa. 471 ; BarnGibbs v. Bartlett, 2W. & S. 29. If a genhill v. Haigh, 53 Pa. 165-; Walthour v.
eral judgment on the merits had been
Spangler, 31 Pa. 523.
entered for the defendant, Poner would
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
not have prosecuted the action with effect.
Amos Boyd issued an execution against
-Pittsurg National Bank v. Hall, 107
Samuel Stillman, and levied on cord wood,
Pa. 583; Tibbal v. Cahoon, 10 W. 232;
worth $75, which was claimed by Poner.
Balsley v. Hoffman, 13Pa. 603. The bond
The wood was sold by the sheriff, Boyd
has been forfeited.
becoming the purchaser. Poner then inWhat, then, can be recovered upon it?
stituted a replevin against Boyd, and gave
It is quite free from doubt that one of the
to the sheriff the customary bond. The
damages arising from the failure to prosewood was delivered to him. At the trial,
cute the replevin, suit with effect is the
Poner suffered a non-suit. He subsedefendant's costs in that action. These
quently tendered the wood to Boyd, who
costs may therefore bc recovered in the
declined to receive it, but instituted this
suit on the replevin bond.-Tibbal v. Caaction on the replevin bond, in his own
hoon, 10 W. 232; Balsley v. Hoffman, 13
name. The damages for the deten i ion of
Pa. 603; Phillips v. Hyde, 1 Dallas 439.
the wood have been $5.
Even if the goods were returned to the
OPINION OF COURT.
defendant on the failure of the replevin
The bond given by the plaintiff in resuit, it is clear that there would have been
plevin is conditioned upon the plaintiff's
damages arising from the previous debeing and appearing before the judges of
privation of the defendant of their possesthe court of Common Pleas, in which the sion. For this taking and detention, the
replevin is pending. oi a day named, theii
successful defendant must be compensated,
and there to prosecute his suit with eftfct, although be has recovered the goods.
and without delay, against the defendant,
These damages might be assessed on the
and also on his making return of the goods
replevin suit.-McCabe v. Morehead, I
and chattels, if return thereof be adjudged
W. & S. 513 ; Easton v. Worthington, 5
by law, and also on his saving and keepS. & R. 130; or not. As well when they
ing harriless the sheriff.-Clark v. Morss,
have been thus assessed-Balsley v. Hoff142 Pa. 311 ; Dunlap's Forms. The suit
man, 13 Pa. 603, as when they have not
on Poner's bond presupposes that one or
been-Pitsburg National Bank v. Hall,
more of these conditions have been broken.
107 Pa. 583, they may be recovered in the
They are not disjunctive conditions, obsuit upon the bond.
servance of one of which will satisfy the
The bond expressly stipulates for the reobligation ; e. g. The duty assumed by
turn of the goods to the defendant, if
the obligor is not to prosecute the replevin
return thereof be adjudged by law. If a
with effect or return the goods after judg- judgment de reforro habendo is rendered,
ment de retorno habendo.-Gibbsv. Bart- and the sheriff, failing to get the goods,
lett, 2 W. & S. 33; Balsley v. -offman 13
returns them elongata, their value could
Pa. 603; Watterson v. Fuellhart, 169 Pa.
be recovered on this condition in the bond.
612 ; 20 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1137. The
-Phillips v Hyde, 1 Dallas 439 ; Clark v.
bond is forfeited if the suit is not proseMorss, 142 Pa. 311; Balsley v. Hoffman,
cuted to effect, irrespective of ajudgment
13 Pa. 603. In this case, however, there
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is no judgment de retorno habendo. Hence
that condition in the bond requirjng the
return of the goods, "if return thereof be
adjudged by law," has not been broken.
Is breach of the condition for the prosecution of the suit with effect sufficient to
support the recovery of the value of the
goods ? It is quite plain that the loss of
the value of the goods is as much a part of
the damages arising from the failure to
prosecute the replevin with effect, when
the goods are not in fact returned, as are
the damages arising from their detention,
or as are the costs. Accordingly, when
the replevin is ended, by a reversal of the
judgment for the plaintiff, in which case
there is, of course, no judgment de retorno
habendo-Gibbs v. Bartlett, 2 W. & S. 29;
or when it is ended by a general judgment
for the defendant without judgment de
retornohabendo-Pittsburg National Bank
v. Hall, 107 Pa. 583, the value of the goods
may be recovered in the suit on the bond.
But, when Poiier discovered that lie had
been non-suited, he tendered the wood to
Boyd, and Boyd refused to accept it. Can
Boyd practically require him to keep the
wood and pay for it? Or has Poner the
option either to pay for the wood or to
tender it to Boyd? In Gibbs v. Bartlett, 2
W. & S. 29, there is a dictum of Rogers J.,
that "the judgment de retorno habendo
is not intended for the benefit of the defendant, butof the plaintiffin the replevin
bond, who in some cases, perhaps, might
prefer a return of the goods to the damages
assessed by the jury," and this language
is quoted with approval by Green J in
Pittsburg National Bank v. Hall 107 Pa.
583. In that case, the defendant in the
suit on the bond failed to show, as he alleged, that the plaintiff had taken the
possession of the goods. It was implied
that, if he had succeeded in showing such
resumption of possession, the plaintiff
could not recover the value of the goods,
and it was decided that, although there
had been a readiness to surrender the
goods, yet, as they had not been in fact
surrendered and accepted by the plaintiff,
the latter could recover their value. Although we as yet have only a dictum in
this State to the effect that the defendant
in a replevin has the option, after he has
defeated the action, either to accept the
goods from the plaintiff, or to insist on

their value in money, we think the rule
there enounced a just one. By taking the
defendant's goods, a wrong is committed
against him in the nature of a trespass.
It is true the sheriff is the agent employed.
But, on the giving of the bond, he has no
option. If an ordinary conversion took
place, the defendant could not discharge
the judgment in trover by tendering back
the chattel taken; nor could he prevent
the recovery of its full value in money by
offering to return it before judgment. -26
Am. & Eng. Encyc. 851.
The bond of the plaintiff in .replevin is
given to the sheriff. The action should
be in his name to the use of the defendant
in the replevin.-Tibbal v. Cahoon, 10 W.
232; Balsley v. Hoffman, 13 Pa. 603 ;
Clark v. Morss, 142 Pa. 311; Pittsburg
National Bank v. Hall, 107 Pa. 584. The
mistake of suing in the name of Boyd is,
however, venial. The Act of May 4, 1852,
2 P. & L. 3632, authorizes amendments,
"by changing or adding the name or
names of any party, plaintiff or defendant,
whenever it shall appear to them (the
courts) that a mistake or omission has been
made in the name or names of any such
party." It Is proper to allow an amendment making the action in the na~me of
the sheriff to the use of Amos Boyd.Felty v. Deaven, 166 Pa. 640; Clement v.
Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 107; Downey v.
Garard, 24 Pa. 52; Kellogg v. Datesman,
2 Phila. Ill; Pittsburg National Bank v.
Hall, 107 Pa. 583. .And the amendment
is now allowed.
The motion for a new trial is therefore
overruled.
AMOS WOLF, AD31., vs. WM. STURTEVANT.
Presumption of payment - Admissions
against interest-Endorsements of payments-Circumstantialevidence of payment.
Assumpsit.
R BERT P. STEWvART and GARRETT B.
STEVENS for the plaintiff.
I. Endorsement of payment upon a bond
in the bandwritingof the obligee furnishes
evidence of the fact of payment upon such
bond, if the payment has been made before the lapse of the time which raises the
presumption of payment; such endorsements being against the interest of the
.obligee.--Trickett on Limitations, 261;
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Addams v. Seitzinger, 1 W. & S. 243;
Cremer's Estate, 5 W. & S. 331; Shiaffer
v. Sbafer, 41 Pa. 51; Clark v. Burn, 86
Pa. 502; Last v. Von Neida, 16 W. N. C.
93 ; Kline v. Kline, 20 Pa. 503; Tilghman
v. Fisher, 9 W. 441 ; Kitchen v. Deardorff,
2 Pa. 481.
2. The endorsement alone is not sufficient evidence that it was made at the time
alleged.-Cremer's Estate, 5 W. & S. 331;
Last v. Von Neida, 16 W. N. C. 93.
MERKEL LANDIS and WENCEL HARTDiAN, JR., for the defendant.
1. From less than twenty years, aided
by circumstances, payment may be presumed.-Tilghman v. Fisher, 9 Watts 441;
Briggs' Appeal, 93 Pa. 485; Hughes v.
Hughes, 54 Pa. 240; Com. v. Snyder, 62
Pa. 153 ; Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83.
2. Fact that defendant was of sufficient
pecuniary ability raises a presumption of
payment.-Bean v. Tonnele, 94N. Y. 381;
liller v. Smith's Exrs., 16 Wend. 425;
Hughes v. Hughes, 54 Pa. 240; Garner v.
Surdford. 2 Sandf. 440.
3. Equity uniformly declines to assist a
person who has slept on his rights or been
negligent.-Long's Estate, 6 Watts 46;
Sclultz v. Pulver, 11 Wend. 361; Slack
v. Horton, 2 Green Ch.. 301 ; Speidel v.
Henrici. 120 U.' S. 377 ; Godden v. Kimreel, 99 U. S. 201 ; Sullivan v. P. & K. Rv.
Co., 94 U. S. 806; McKnight v. Taylor, 42
U. S. 161.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.
Sturtevant, on June 17, 1870, executed a
bond to Jacob Wolf for $1,000, payable one
year after date. On June 17, 1871, $160
were paid by Sturtevant. Endorsed on
the bond, in the handwriting of Jacob
Wolf, are, IPaid, Oct. 17, 1871, $50;"
"Paid, June 17, 1872, $200 ;" "Paid, June
17, '1873, $200 ;" " Paid, June 17, 1876,
$200;" "Received, May 17, 1878, $150."
The memorandum of June 17, 1876, was
signed by Jacob Wolf and Win. Sturtevant. Wolf died on Dec. 1, 1890, and on
April 9, f897, this assumpsit was brought
by Amos Wolf, his administrator, for the
unpaid balance.
Sturtevant's defense is that the bond has
been paid. Twenty-five years and ten
months had elapsed since the day on which
the bond became payable, when the action
was brought. If no other facts existed,
the legal inference from this long time
would be that, the bond had been paid.Runner's Appeal, 121 Pa. 649; Gregory v.
Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 611; Porter v.
Nelson, 121 Pa. 628; Breneman's Appeal,
121 Pa. 641 ; Wheelen v. Phillips, 140 Pa.
33 ; Trickett, Limitations, 429, et seg.

)3ut the lapse of twenty years from the
day when the debt becomes payable forms
only a rebuttable presumption of payment.
There may be direct evidence that the
debt has not been paid. There may be
circumstances from which non-payment
may be properly inferred. Admissions
that the debt is unpaid; payments of interest, or partial payments of the principal, are sufficient to support the conclusion
that the debt was unpaid when they were
made.-Limitations, 468, 478. There is no
evidence of partial payments of the Sturtevant bond, other than the endorsements
on it in Wolf's handwriting, with the exception of the memorandum of June 17,
1876. Are these endorsements sufficient
evidence of payment? An admission by
a creditor that his debt has been wholly
or partially paid is usually an admission
made against his interest, and therefore
can be used by him at a later time, if it
subsequently becomes serviceable to himself. But it must have been self-disserving
when it was made, in order to make it
subsequently admissible in his favor. An
admission of a receipt of payment, made
before the statute of limitations has runLimitations, 359, or before the presumption of payment has been completed by
the lapse of twenty years-Limitations,
479, would be against, interest, while such
an admission, made after that time, might
have been made in order to toll the statute
of limitations, or the presumption of payment, and therefore for the advantage of
the declarant. Hence, such admissions
are not receivable, until it clearly appears
that they were against interest.-Ibid;
Runner's Appeal, 121 Pa. 649. There must
be evidence of the actual date of the credits
endorsed, other than the date in the endorsement, in order to show that they
were made at a time at which they would
have been against the interest of the declarant.-Ibid. Wolf's statements, that
he received $50 on Oct. 17, 1871 ; $200 on
June 17, 1872 ; $200 on June 17, 1873 ; $150
on May 17, 1878, might have been -written
at any time prior to his death on Dec. 1,
1890.
But, as they were written by him, and
as he died before twenty Y9ears had expired
since the maturity of the bond, they must
have been, and therefore they werewritten
when it was against his interest to write
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them. The memorandumofJune 17, 1873,
was signed by William Sturtevant. It is
therefore an admission by him that he paid
$200 on that day, and, as such, would be
employed to show that the debt had not
then been paid. But, since more than
twenty years had elapsed since June 17,
1876, when the action was brought, the
admission would not be available. The
credit of May 17, 1878, written before the
presumption of payment had matured, is
sufficient to establish a payment at that
date.
As then the suit was brought on the
bond within twenty years after the admission by Sturtevant, involved in his payment of May 17, 1878, there must be some
other evidence that it has since been paid
than the mere lapse of 18 years and 11
months.-Morrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28;
Limitations, 497. There is no positive,
explicit evidence. But circumstances may
be relied on to prove it.-lorrison v. Collins, 127 Pa. 28; Walls v. Walls, 170 Pa.
48; Limitations, 500, et seg. Some of these
circumstances are, full ability of the debtor
to pay, and impecuniousness of the creditor-Morrison v. Collins, supra; notice
by the executor of the debtor to all creditors to present their claims, and the
claimant's omission to present his for a
year-Walls v. Walls, 170 Pa. 48 ; the lapse
of a considerable period, e.g., seven years,
without demand for payment by the creditor-Ibid; others may be found in Limitations, 500. Are there circumstances
sufficient to justify an inference that the
Sturtevant bond has been paid? There is
no evidence whether Wolf had made no
demand for payment for any considerable
time before his death; or whether his administrator has done the same since his
appointment. If non-demand is to be
relied on by the defendant, it must be
proved by him. The facts indicate payments at intervals from June, 1871, to
May, 1878. These intervals were not similar in length. They varied from four
months to one year, two years and three
years. There is no light on the pecuniary
ability of Sturtevant after 1878, or on that
of Wolf. When the last payment, that of
May 17, 1878, was made, there remained
due about $340. There is always an improbability that a creditor will wait a long
time without enforcing payment of an un-

paid debt, but the law has chosen to fixa
delay of twenty years as the turning point
at which the bdrden of disproving payment begins to rest on the plaintiff. We
cannot find in the delay after 1878, preceded, as it -was, by partial payments,
sufficient to authorize an inference that
the bond has been.paid. It will therefore
be your duty, gentlemen of the jury, to
return a verdict for the plaintiff for the
residue of the debt, after allowing the
proved credits.

JOHN KILNAP vs. LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Policy of life insurance-Assignment of
policy-Notice of assignment-Accommodation indorser.
Assumpsit.
JOHN G. MILLER and FRANK H. FENTON for tie plaintiff.
1. The insurance company is -liable for
the acts of its officer while acting in the
capacity of agent.-Mundorff v. Wickershamn, 63 Pa. 87; Hagerstown Bank v.
London S. F. Asso, 3 Grant ]35; Am. &
Eng. Encyc., Vol. I, p. 1137.
2. The assignee has a legal interest in
the policy, and can bring an action in his
own name.-Kinsly v. Life Ins. Co., 62
Mass. 393; Palmer v. Merill, 60 Mass. 282;
Burroughs v. State Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
97,Mass. 3593. Mrs. Johnson, by her act of assignnient, is estopped from asserting any right.
-Am. & Eng. Encyc., Vol. 7, p. 1; Kinto
v. Carpenter, 7 Col. 528; Powel's Appeal,
98 Pa. 403.
FRANK B. SELLERS and WALTER B.
FREED for the defendant.
1. No notice to the company of the assignment to Kilnap.-13 Am. & Eng. Eneye. 650; Mutual Aid Society v. Lupald,

101 Pa. 118; Palmer v. Merill, 6 Cush. 286.

2. Assignment of chose in action must
be by delivery.-Trough's Estate, 75 Pa.
115; Scott v. Dixon, 108 Pa. 6; Pringle v.
Pringle, 59 Pa. 286; Palmer v. Merill,
supra.
3. When assignment is for the purpose
of securing creditor, although he is entitled'to recover the face of the ,policy, he
cannot hold what is not necessary for his
indemnity.-Downey v. Hoffer, 110 Pa.
109 Gilbert v. Moose, 8 Out. 74; Gilman
v. durtis, 66 Cal. 116; 13 Am. & Eng. Eneye. 648.
STATEDfENT OF THE CASE.

Amort took out a policy on his life, payable to his daughter, Mrs. Johnson, who
resided, married in England, but retained
the custody of the policy himself. Amort

THE FORUM.
borrowed money, $2,000, from a bank on a
note drawn by himself and payable to
Samfiel Cooper, which Cooper endorsed,
on Amort's assigning the policy to him.
This assignment was made under a power
of attorney, duly executed by Mrs. Johnson and her husband. The note maturing,
the bank required payment, and Cooper
induced A. to endorse the note over to
John Kilnap, who paid it, and to whom
Cooper in turn assigned the policy. Before thus assigning the policy Cooper had,
in conformity with a notice therein, "This
company will not recognize ally assignment of which it has not received written
notice," sent to the company written notice of the assignment to him. The
premiums continued to be paid by Armort
for three years, when he died. By some
oversight the officer of the company made
no entry of the notice of the assignment
in the proper book., Mrs. Johnson, who
had retained the policy, made l)roof of
-death, and was paid the sum named therein, $10,000. Subsequently Kilnap, as assignee, brings this action.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Charles Amort took out a policy for
$10,000 on his life. payable to his daughter,
Mrs. Johnson, who resided, married, in
England. Subspquently Amort borrowed
$2,000 from a bank on a note drawn by
himself, and payable to Samuel Cooper,
which Cooper endorsed for his accomniodation, on his assigning the policy to him.
This assignment was made under a power
of attorney, duly executed by Mrs. Johnson and her husband. Although the policy
was not transferred to Cooper, it was in
Amort's possession. The note maturing,
the bank required payment. Cooper induced it to endorsethe note over to Kilnap,
who paid the bank, and to whom Cooper
in turn assigned the policy. On the policy
was printed a notice, "This company will
not recognize any assignment of which it
has not received written notice." Accordingly, before assigning the policy to Kilnap, Cooper sent to the company written
notice of the assignment to him, Cooper,
but by some oversight the officer made no
entry of the assignment in the proper
book. The premiums continued to be paid
by Amort for three years, when he died.
Mrs. Johnson, who had obtained the policy

from Amort, made proof of his death, and
received from the company $10,000. Subsequently this action was brought by Kilnap.
Cooper "sent to the company written
notice of the assignment to him," in accordance with the stipulation upon the
policy. He was not responsible for the
failure of its officer to make the proper
minute of it, or to file it away where it
could be examined, or for its payment to
Mrs. Johnson in forgetfulness of the assignment. No notice of Cooper's assignment to Kihap was sent to the company,
and this would have been fatal to an action
by Kilnap, if the company had paid
Cooper. The payment to Mrs. Johnson
was made after it knew that she wits not
the owner of the policy. The company
ought to have retained the money until
Cooper, or some one with his authority,
made demand for it.
That a life policy can be assigned by the
beneficiary is too well settled to require
discussion.-l"Biddle, Insurance, 261; Act
March 14,1873, 2 P. & L. "-',;77;M Hale v.
McDonnell, 175 Pa. 632; Shaak v. Meily,
26 W. N. C. 569. It is suggested that only
an abortive attempt at an assignment to
Cooper was made; and that the imsignment was never consummated by t delivery of the policy. It may be true that
a gift of a chose in action cannot be effbcted
without a delivery of the chose. It is not
true that a transfer for value cannot Ine
made without a delivery of the chose.
Had the paper embodying the assignment
to Cooper not been delivered, the assignment would not have been made.-Pringle
v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 281; Trough's Appeal,
75 Pa. 115; Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. i.
The paper was delivered. The mere retention of the policy by Charles Amort did
not invalidate the assignment.
There must be aii insurable interest in
the person named as beneficiary in the lire
policy, unless that policy is purchased by
the cestui que vie..-Scott v. Dickson, 108
Pa. 6; Hill v. Ins. Ass., 154 Pa. 29; Iasonic
Aid Ass. v. Jones, 154 Pa. 99; Overbeek v.
Overbeck, 155 Pa. 5. An assignment of
the policy would be deemed a wager, and
partially invalid, unless at the time it was
made the assignee had an insurable interest.-Downey v. Hoffer, 110 Pa. 109;
Carpenter v. U. S. Ins. Co., 161 Pa. 9.
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Had, then, Samuel Cooper an insurable
interest? That a creditor has an'insurable
interest, which will support a policy issued
to him-Grant v. Kline, 115 Pa. 618, or an
assignment of it, made to bim-Shaffer v.
Spangler, 144 Pa. 223; Ulrich v. Reincehil,
143 Pa. 238; McHale v. McDonnell, 175
Pa. 632; Corcoran v. Ins. Co., 179 Pa. 132;
183 Pa. 443; Shank v. Meily, 26 W. N. C.
569, is indisputable. Cooper was not a
creditor of Amort when the assignment to
him was made, but he was an accommodation endorser, and, as such, under a
conditional pecuniary liability. The existence of the liability was an insurable
interest.-Scott v. Dickson, 108 Pa. 6.
Was the assignment absolute, or was it
made as collateral security? If it was absolute, and, valid, Cooper, or Cooper's
assignee, Kilnap, might have recovered,
if anything, $10,000 from the company.
If it was as collateral security, only $2,000,
and the interest thereon, could be recovered, for all in excess of that amount would
be the property of Mrs. Johnson, whom
the company has already paid. There is
a large difference between $2,000 and
$10,000, and the purchase of a $10,000 policy
for a debt of $2,000 might be suspected of
being speculative. If, as is usually the
case, the assignee undertook the duty of
paying the premiums, he would be practically paying for the policy, not only the
amount of the debt, and the interest thereon, but the sum of the premiums, and the
interest thereon, during the life of the
debtor. The length of this life cannot be
foreseen. He may then take an assignment of a policy not manifestly considerably in excess of all that he will have to
pay plus the debt, and the interest thereon.-Ulrich v. Reincehl, 143 Pa. 238;
Shaffer v. Spangler, 144 Pa. 223. A policy
of $3,000 was not thus in excess when the
debt was $743- Grant v. Kline, 115 Pa. 618;
nor one for $2,000, when the debt was $700
-MeHale v. McDonnell, 175 Pa. 632; and
a jury might properly be allowed to find
that an assignment of a $3,000 policy to
one whose debt was $100 was not a wagering transaction.-Shaak v. Meily, 26 W.
N. C. 569. Amort in fact paid the premiums. But there was a possibility that
he would not, and that Cooper would be
compelled to pay them, in order to maintain the policy. Had the jury found that

the assignment to Cooper was absolute,
and that it was not a gambling transaction, we should not feel justified in disturbing their verdict.
It was contended at the trial that the
assignment to Cooper was made to secure
him from his liability on the endorsetnent.
The circumstances that could be cited to
prove that this was its nature are the difference between $2,000 and $10,000 (but see
Meale v. McDonnell, 175 Pa. 632) ; the
conditional character of Cooper'sliability;
the facts that Amort remained liable to.
him on the note; and *that Amort
continued to pay the premiums. The
verdict of the jury, to the effect that the
assignment was conditional, is not complained of by the defendant. We think it
justified.
It was objected that the action should
have been brought in the name of
the beneficiary in the policy, Mrs. Johnson, to the use of Cooper, to the use of
Kilnap. The beneficiary might sue in her
own name, although the contract was not
between her and the company.-York Co.
Mutual Aid Ass. v. Myers, 11 W. N. C.
541; 2 Biddle, Ins., 461; Corcoran v. Ins.
Co., 179 Pa. 132; Beatty's Appeal, 122 Pa.
428. The act of March 14, 1873, 2 P. & L.
2377, authorizes the assignee to bring suit
in his name for his interest in any policy
of life, fire or marine insurance.
We have said little of the assignment
from Cooper to Kilnap. There can be any
number of assignments. That to Kilnap
is to secure to him indemnity for performing that which Cooper would have had to
perform, i. e., payment of the note. He
can recover as much as Cooper could. As
we see no error in the trial, or in the verdict, the motion for a new trial by the
defendants is overruled.
JOHN

CALLISTER vs. ELECTRIC
RAILWAY CO.

-Presumptionagainst negligence in child
under fourteen years-Plaintiff must
prove negligence of parent-Negligence
of company-Errorof judgment.
Trespass for negligence.
THOMAS B. PEPPER and WILLIAM K.
SHISSLER for the plaintiff.
1. The boy was too young to be guilty of
contributory negligence, and this is a question for the jury.-Schilling v. Abernethy,
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112 Pa. 437; Erie City Ry. Co. v. Schuster,
ll3Pa. 412; Jaquinta v. Traction Co., 166
Pa. 63; Taylor v. Canal Co., 113 Pa. 162;
Strawbridge v. Bradford, 128 Pa. 200; Ry.
v. Gallagher, 108 Pa. 528; Kehler v.
Schwenk, 144 Pa. 348; Ry. v. Tfassard, 75
Pa. 367; Weaver v. Iselin, 161 Pa. 386.
No negligence imputable to parent when
child is old enough to be upon street'unaccompanied. - Com. v. Stewart, 2 Pa.
Dist. 43: Dunreath v. Ry. Co,, 161 Pa. 124;
Johnson v. Ry., 160 Pa. 647; Jaquinta v.
Traction Co., 166 Pa. 63.
2. The driver must at all times have the
car under his control.-Buents v. Traction
Co., 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Schlnur v. Traction Co., 153 Pa. 29.
G. FRED. VOWINCKEL and PHILIP E.
RADLE for the defendant company.
1. The speed of the car cannot determine
the question of contributory negligence. Funk v. Traction Co., 17.5 Pa. 5.59. Every
one muststop, look and listen.-Ehrisinan
v. R. Co., 150 Pa. 180; Whellahan v. Traction Co., 150 Pa. 187; Omslaer v. Traction
Co., 168 Pa. 519; Carson v. St. R. Co., 147
Pa. 219. Railroad companies are not liable
for any injury to children of tender years
while trespassing on their tracks, or to
their parents for less than wanton or intentional injury.-Woodbridge v. D. L. &
W. R. R., 16 V. N. C. 55; WVoodbridge v.
D. L. & V. R. R., 105 Pa. 460; Clark v.
P. & R. R. Co., 1 W. N. C. 315; Glassey v.
Railway Co., 57 Pa. 172; Funk v. Electric
Traction Co., 175 Pa. 559; Cauley v. R. R.
Co., 95 Pa. 398; Chilton v. Central Traction Co., 152 Pa. 425.
2. A person who, N ithout fault on his
own part, finds hihfiself in the presence of
a sudden emergency, which imperils the
lives of others, and has but a moment ot
time in which to think and act, cannot be
charged with negligence, if, in acting., he
makes a mistake ofjudginent.-Sekerak v.
Jutte,153 Pa. 117; Brown v. French, 104
Pa. 604; Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 102 Pa. 11.5; P.
R. R. v. Werner, 89 Pa. 59; Aiken v. P.
R. R., 130 Pa. 380; Carson v. St. Railway,
147 Pa. -219; Oberdorfer v. R. R. Co., 149
Pa. 6.
STA T IMENT OF THE CASE.

Amos Callister, a boy ten years of age,
son of the plaintiff, at 3 i. it. on the 3d of
February, 1897, itarted to run across Main
street, in the borough of Aldine, on which
were the tracks of the defendant. A ear
was approaching at the rate of fourteen
miles per hour, but a wagon, coming in
the same direction, prevented the boy's
seeing it until he got within the tracks.
He was there struck, the car passing over
him and not stopping until it had gone
two lengths. The motorman then backed,
and caused the car to go over the boy

again, killing him. The defendant requests the court to say to the jury : (1)
The negligence of the boy, in running on
the tracks, would preclude a recovery. (2)
If the backing of the car over the boy was
the result of a mere error of judgment, occasioned by the excitement, the defendant
would not be liable for the death.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The Electric Railway Co. has a right to
operate its cars on the supposition that all
persons will avoid getting upon its tracks
until they have employed the appropriate
precautions. It is an imperative duty to
look and listen before one ventures upon
the track of an electric railway.-Ehrisman v. Harrisburg Railway Co., 1.50 Pa.
180; Ornslaer v. Traction Co., 108 Pa. 519;
Wheelahan v. Phila. Traction Co., 150 Pa.
187. And if, in broad day, one is run
down by a car while within the tracks,
that fact is conclusive evidence that due
looking and listeningwere not performed,
or that the risk was deliberately run of
being overtaken by the approaching car.
Amos Callister did not see the car, because
of a wagon. Had he been adult, it would
have been his duty to wait until the wagon
had ceased to obstruct his view of the
track before running upon it. But Amos
Callister was only ten years of age. It is
not the-duty of a child to possess the same
degree of caution, attentiveness and heed
as an adult, and the standard of care differs
for persons of these two classes. If the
jury is of opinion that the injured person
has shown the care which is common to
those of his age under similar circumstances, he will be exonerated front negligence.-Schilling v. Abernethy, 112 Pa.
437; Erie City Railway v. Shuster, 113 Pa.
412; Taylor v. L. & H. Canal Co., 113 Pa.
162. In late years a presumption has been
made by the courts. Below the age of
fourteen, a child is presumed incapable of
care, and therefore of negligence-Nagle
v. Allegheny Valley Railroad, 88 Pa. 35;
Kehler v. Schwenck, 144 Pa. 348; Greenway v. Conroy, 160 Pa. 185; a boy thirteen
years and four months old-Strawbridge
v. Bradford, 128 Pa. 200; or thirteen years
and two months old-West Phila. Railway v. Gallagher, 108 Pa. 524. As there
is no light on the personal peculiarities of
Amos Callister, the presumption of his in-
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capacity for heed ind care stands unrebutted. In Jaquinta v. Traction Co., 166
Pa. 63, the negligence of a boy between
twelve and thirteen years of age was submitted to the jury. Were Amos the plaintifi; therefore, he would not be precluded
from recovering, on account of his rashness, if he succeeded in showing that his
injury resulted from the negligence of the
defendant. He is dead. The action is not
by him, but by his father.
If a collision with a car killed a horse,
or cow, or dog, though these animals could
not be negligent, their owner might be in
not keeping watch over them, and taking
proper measures to prevent their roaming
upon the track. A similar principle governs the right of a parent to obtain compensation for injuries to his child. Though
the child is without responsibility for carelessness, the parent may be responsibly
careless in not keeping him out of danger.
If lie is thus careless, he cannot recover
damages for injury to the child. Thus, e.
g., if he permits a child twenty-five
months old to get on a track, he can recover nothing from the railroad for its
destruction.-Phila., etc., R. R. v. Long,
75 Pa. 257; Johnson v. Railway, 160 Pa.
647; (f. Glassey v. Hestonville, etc., Railway Co., 57 Pa. 172; Cawley v. Pittsburg,
etc., Railway, 95 Pa. 398;. McCool v. Coal
Co., 150 Pa. 638. If a very young child
gets on the street, and is run over, this
circumstance is prima facie evidence of
inattention to or carelessness of the child
on the part of the parent-Phila., etc., R.
R. v. Long, 75 Pa. 257; but other evidence
may repel this inference, and exonerate
the parent, and so entitle him to recover
-Phila., etc., R. R. v. Long; Schnur v.
Citizens' Traction Co., 153 Pa. 29; Evers
v. Phila. Traction Co., 176 Pa. 376; Dunseath v. Traction Co., 161 Pa. 124. In the
case of older children, e. g., one six years
old, such a presumption of negligence is
apparently not .made, but the burden is on
the person alleging it to prove it.-Woodbridge v. R. R. Co., 105 Pa. 460. We do
not think the inference legitimate, from
the fact that Amos Callister, a boy ten years
old, was on the street; that his parents
permitted him to be there, or that they
were negligent in permitting him to be
there.
But, it must be carefully noted that, although the heedless act of Amos will not,

because it was heedless, prevent a recovery
by his father, on the ground of its being
contributory negligence, it is important as
casting light on the carelessness of the defendant. A collision may occur by the
reckless running of a child upon the tracks.
No reasonable precaution of the railroad
could possibly prevent it. The company
is not bound to anticipate such acts, and
guard against them.-R. R. v. Spearen,
47 Pa. 300. It is not required to foresee
the sudden act of a child seven.years old.
-Hestonville Passenger Railway v. Connell, 88 Pa. 520; Fleishman v. Neversink
Mountain R. R., 174 Pa. 281; Chilton v.
Central Tractiofi Co, 1529 Pa. 425; Flanigan v. R. W. Co., 163 Pa: 102. A boy,
thirteen years old, runs diagonally athwart
a crossing of two streets into a car, and is
struck. The company is not liable, because it is not negligent.--Funk v. Electric
Traction Co., 175 Pa. 559. That the defendant did not adopt a speed, or other
precaution, against a pedestrian's darting
suddenly on its track, is no indication of
negligence.
The doctrine contained in the, second
point of the defendant is sound, with a
qualification. The ordinarily careful or
skillful man is not as skillful or careful in
sudden emergencies as at periods of calm
and deliberation. For the selection of the
less wise of several measures, he will not,
therefore, be responsible, if, in the exercise
of ordinary care and skill, under such circumstances, a man might have made such
selection.-Donnahue v. Kelley, 181 Pa.
93; Floyd v. Phila. & R. R. R., 162 Pa. 29;
Sekerak v. Jutte, 153 Pa. 117; Oberdorfer
v. R. R, 149 Pa. 6; Brown v. French, 104
Pa. 604; Passenger Railway v. Kelley, 102
Pa. 115. But it is for the jury to say
whether the action of the motorman was
such as a reasonably competent and careful man would not have adopted, even
under such circumstances. If not, the
company would be liable.
GEORGE DYSON, TO USE OF, ETC.,
vs. FRANCIS APPOLD.
Building contract-Entire contract-Insolvency of contractor.
Assnmpsit.
G. FnAxic VETZEL and ALBERT T.
MORGAN for the plaintiff.
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Upon a bonafide intention to perform,
and a partial failure, not involving a
fraudulent purpose, there may be a recovery of the contract price, less the
amount required to put the work in that
condition the contract call.; for.--Clark on
('ot.,
782; Austin v. Hughes, 5 Kulp 225;
Blood v. Wilson, 141 Mass. 25;
ofoore v.
Carter cal., 146 Pa. 492. The defaultwas
caused by circumstances not under the
control of Dyson, and he may recover for
work done.-Clark on Cont., 782; Scully
v. Kirkpatrick. 79 Pa. 324; Spaulding v.
Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40; Harrington v. iron
Works, 119 Mrass. 82. Failure to repudiate
a contract, immediately after a breach of
condition, and an acceptaice of benefits
under it, subsequent to the breach, acts as
a waiver of the condition -rd a recovery
may be had pro tanto.-lark on Cont.,
676; Robinson v. Snyder, 25 Pa. 203; Gallagher v. Sharpless, 134 Pa. 134.
FRANK T. MORROw and
AVLTER G.
TREEIY

for defendant.

There can be no recovery for part perforiance of an entire contract.-29 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. 894; Glacius v. Black, 50 N.
Y. 145; Wa3yde v. Haycock, 25 Pa. 382;
Sinclair v. Bowles, 17 E. C. L. 50: Faxon
v. Mansfield, 2 Mass. 147; Smith v. Brady,
17 N. Y. 173; Wilkinson v. Beeker, 155
Pa. 194; Olmstead v. Bead, 19 Pick. 528.
The fact that a partial performance was
beneticial to defendant does not imply a
promise to pay for it.-Elliot v. Caldwell,
43 Minn. 357.
As a set-off to plaintiff's claim, defendant alleges damages by reason of the breach
of contract.-Bishop v. Price, 24 Wis. 480;
Sticker v. Overpeck, 127 Pa. 446; Britton
v. Turner, 6 N. H1. 48.
Insolvency is not among the circumstances which will disoharge from contract
by reason of impossibility of performance.
-Clark on Cont., 678; School-Teachers v.
Bennett, 27 N. J. L. 513; Jones v. U. S.,
96 U. S. 24; Adams v. Nichols, 19 Pick.
275.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On May 3, 1894, Dyson contracted with
Appold to erect a house on Appold's lot for
$4,000, according to a plan and specifications. The house was to be completed in
nine months, and, on completion, the
money was to be paid. The digging of the
cellar was commenced a day or two after
May 3d, and the work went forward till
the walls were up and the roof on. At
that stage Dyson became insolvent, and
assigned for the benefit of his creditors,
and the work was stopped. After a suspension of nine months, Appold made a
contract with John Fennimore to complete
the house upon the specifications of the

Dyson contract for $1,250. The house was
finished by October 1, 1895, and Fennimore
was paid the $1,250. This action is brought
by Dyson's assignee to recover compensation for the work done.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The contract between Dyson and Appold is what is known as an entire one.
The many acts included in the erection of
a house are grouped into one bundle, and
a compensation is stipulated for,for the
group, not for the elements composing it.
Four thousand dollars are to be paid on
the completion and for the completion of the house.
No compensation
is promised for the component materials or processes-for the brick, the
lumber, the hardware, the mason's work,
the carpenter's work. The house has not
been completed by Dyson. Upon the
contract, literally interpreted, he is not
entitled to recover anything. Nor would
he have been if he had carried the construction almost, bftt not quite, to the point
of completion. Although ten additional
dollars would.have fully fii ished the house,
Dyson failing to spend these ten dollars on
it would have failed to entitle himself to
anything.
Such a result is so seriously inequitable
that the courts have hesitated to withhold
all compensation for defect of performance.
Of A, who has contracted to do work, and
willfully refuses to complete it, compensation is forfeited for what has been done.Hartman v. Weighan, 171 Pa. 46 ;. Kettle
v. Harvey, 21 Vt. 299; Faxon v. Mansfield,
2 Mass. 147; Keener, Quasi-Contracts, 215.
The mode of performance may seriously
and consciously deviate from that stipulated for; so that the product of the performance is useless. In that case, no
compensation can be recovered, whatever
the cost of the performance to the claimant. A having contracted with B to drill
for B an oil well, of 54-inch bore, drilled
one of only 44-inch. He could recover no
compensation-Gillespie Tool Co. v. Wilson, 123 Pa. 19, whether the well actually
bored was useful or not to B. If the thing
produced is of no value, it is still clearer
that there could be no compensation for it.
B had contracted to build for A a house.
A house was built, but so defective as to
be uninhabitable. It had to be torn down.
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For such a house A was not compelled to
pay anything. And, after the time for the
completion of the house had passed, B
could not take down the house and build
another, after he was prohibited by A, and
obtain compensation for the substitutional
house. In that case, say the court, there
was "no performance; not merely a case
of imperfection, but of total deficiency, so
far as they [the plaintiffs] had gone, and
the work must be done over again to be of
any value as a dwelling-house."-iller
v. Phillips, 31 Pa. 218.
In these cases there was a willful refusal
to perform the contract, or a willful,
serious misperformance. When the party
performs bona fide and substantially,
slight defects or deviations will not prevent a recovery of a fair compensation.Pepper v. Philadelphia, 114 Pa. 96; Preston v. Phinny, 2 W. & S. 53; Sticker v.
Overpeck, 127 Pa. 446; Chambers v. Jaynes,
4 Pa. 39; Moore v. Carter, 146 Pa. 492;
Vade v. Haycock, 25 Pa. 382; Austin v.
Hughes, 5 Kulp 2-5; Blood v. Wilson, 141
lass. 25; 29 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 891. The
fact that the roof and floor of a house were
not strictly what the contract called for
did not preclude a recovery by the builder.
-Gallagher v. Sharpless, 134 Pa. 134.
No fault is found with so much of the
work as was done by Dyson. He began it
promptly. He prosecuted it duly. The
walls and the roof were, so far as.appears,
built conformably with the contract. But
the erection was arrested midway by the
insolvency of Dyson. He was unable to
proceed, and he did not proceed further.
Does he forfeit what he had done? If the
walls and roof had been useless to Appold,
it would be inequitable to compel Appold
to pay for them. Dyson's loss would not
have been Appold's gain. In several cases
the contract required the building and delivery to the owner of the land of a house,
constructed according to the contract. If
a fire destroyed the house before completion, the builder was not allowed to recover anything from the builder. The
builder got no advantage, and there was,
in substance, not even a part performance,
for all the results of the labor were obliterated.-Tompkins v. Dudley, 9-5 N. Y.
272; Adams v. Nichols, 19 Pick. 275.
The walls and roof built by Dyson conformed to the contract. They were ac-

cepted by.Appold. He employed Fennimore to complete the house, and the price
he paid Fennimore was less than it would
have been by the amount that Fennimore
would have demanded for the construction
of the roof and walls. Unless Appold has
suffered collateral damages equal to or
greater than this amount, it would not be
inequitable to require him to pay the difference between this amount and those damages to Dyson. If requiring him thus to
pay is impolitic, it must be because of the
reason for Dyson's discontinuahce of the
performance of the contract.
There are certain contracts, from the
performance of which- inability will discharge. Sickness will excuse a pianist
from performing according to contract.Robinson v. Davidson, L. R. 6 Ex. 269; 3
Am. & Eng. Encyc. 902; Gf. also, Harriugton v. Iron Works, 119 Mass. 82;
Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 40; Scully v.
Kirkpaitrick, 79 Pa. 324; Clark, Cont. 782.
Dyson's contract is, however, not of the
class from which sickness would excuse,
nor is there any authority for holding that
financial incapacity would excuse him
from performance. His insolvency could
be no protection against Appold's demand
for damages. But, the question before us
is not Whether his insolvency will excuse
him from paying damages caused to Appold by his default, but whether a desistence from the prosecution of the contract,
caused by it, will deprive him of a right
to compensation from Appold for the excess of the benefits conferred by his imperfect performance, above the damages.
The contract. was entered into in good
faith. It was well performed until the insolvency. Insolvency may overtake any
man without fault. We are not able to
see why Appold should be allowed to profit
to the extent of a possible thousand dollars
by Dyson's calamity. The policy which
would make Dyson forfeit the expenses
incurred by him, if he willfully refused to
go on with the performance, or if he willfully misperformed, is far from justifying
a forfeiture when the arrest of the performance is due to circumstances apparently beyond his control.-Cf. Keener,
Quasi-Contracts, 244 In Dermott v. Jones,
69 U. S. 1, there was a contract by A to
build a house for B, and to deliver it
"ready for use and occupation." The
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house was completed, but, owing to a defect in the soil, its walls cracked, and it
became uninhabitable, and had to be taken
down by B and rebuilt. It was thus not
delivered ready for use and occupation.
As there had been good faith on A's part,
and the work done was of some benefit to
B in excess of his damages, A was held
entitled to compensation. Such research
as we have been able to make has not
brought to our notice any case in which
the effect of performance incomplete, because of supervening insolvency, has been
considered. We think, ih view of the
cause of Dyson's non-performance,it would
be inequitable to allow Appold to profit at
his expense.
No point was made as to the declaration. Whether the Tecovery should be
upon the contract, or upon a quasi-contract, it is unnecessary for us to decide.
We think the foundation of the action
is not the expenditure of Dyson, but the
benefit conferred on Appold. If the walls
and roof were worth $600 only to the latter, the former could recover no more,
although they cost him $1,200. Any damages arising from the delay in performing
ought also to be deducted. To the extent
to which, in excess of all damages, Appold
has profited by the walls and roof constructed by Dyson, we think the latter is
entitled to recover.
As the trial was conducted in confornifty
with this principle, there is no reason for
setting aside the verdict. The rule for a
new trial is therefore discharged.

JULIA A. RADLE and D.
LONG for the defendant.

EDWARD

Rent is an incident to a reversion and
passes with a grant or assignment of the
same.-3 Kent Coin. 464; Mortimer v.
O'Reagan, 10 Phila. 500; Duff v. Fitzwater,
54 Pa. 224; Bank of Pa. v. Wise, 3 Watts
394; Johnson v. Smith, 3 P. & W. 471;
Menough's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 432. Rent
was not due until 12 P. ., Oct. 8th, and
could not be demanded until next day.
Mary's v. Anderson, 24 Pa. 276; McKinney
v. Reader, 6 Watts 41.
Months are to be considered calendar
in all transactions between man and man.
15 Am. & Eng. Ency. 712; Shapley v.
Garey, 6 S.& R. 540.
That the lessee is bound topay the rent
to the grantee, see 12 Am. and Eng. Ency.
683; Mortimer v. O'Reagan, 10 Phila. 500;
Fleming v. Tilford, 7 Phila. 301; White v.
Arthur, 24 Pa. 99.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Nichols on Sept. 9, 1894, orally let a house
to Jefferson at a monthly rent of $27.50
payable at the end of every month. On
October 8, 1894, at 4 P. M., Nichols conveyed the premises to William Filbert,
who agreed that he would not disturb Jefferson until he had had due notice to quit.
Jefferson was allowed to remain in possession without notice until February 9, 1895,
when Filbert notified him to leave on
March 9, 1895. He left on that day. This
action is by Nichols for the rent.
Jefferson was a tenant from month to
month. The first month began on Sept.
9, 1894, and ended on October 8, 1894. In
Mary's v. Anderson, 24 Pa. 272, a yearly
lease commencing on April 1st, was held
to terminate on March 31st of the following year. A lease for a series of years comNICHOLS vs. JEFFERSON.
mencing on June 12, 1890, the second year
began on June 12, 1891. Nesbit v. Godfrey, 155 Pa. 2.51. But Jefferson's first
Landlord and Tenant.-Lease.-tent.
monthly term did not close until midnight
Assignment of reversion.
of october 8th. Eight hours before its
termination, Nichols, the landlord, conAssumpsit.
veyed the reversion to Filbert.
J. PERRY WOOD andHERAN M. SYPWhen a landlord conveys the reversion,
ERD for plaintiff.
he may stipulate that the rent thereafter
As between Nichols and Jefferson, the to become due under the case shall continue
month was up. The 8th of October was to be payable to him, Beal v. Boston Car
the last day of the month. Until Jefferson
received different notice his landlord was Spring Co., 12.5 Mass. 157; 12 Am. and Eng.
Nichols and if he received notice after 12 Ency.754. When he does not thus stipuo'clock, Oct. 8th, then the rent must be late, the right to receive the rent passes to
paid to Nichols. Jefferson could not be the alienee of the land. The right, that is,
charged with constructive notice at the to receive the rent for the period 'within
time of the conveyance. Rent is debitum
which the conveyance is made, as well as
inpraesenti though solvendum infuturo.
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for all subsequent periods. Thus, if therent is payable half-yearly, and the conveyance is made near the end 6f a semiannual period, the rent falling due at the
expiration thereof is all payable to the
assignee. Bank of Penna. v. Wise, 3 W.
3894; 1Mary's v. Anderson, 24 Pa. 272. If the
transfer of the reversion takes place by the
death of the reversioner, the right to receive the instalment first falling due thereafter, and all other instalments, passes not
to the executor or administrator, but to the
devisees or heirs; Cobel v. Cobel, 8 Pa. 342;
McDowell v. Addams, 45 Pa. 430. If the
sale is made by the sheriff, his vendee acquires the right to such rent as becomes
payable thereafter, Long v. Severs, 103 Pa.
517; Bank of Penna. v. Wise, 3 W. 394; if
by the administrator for the payment of
debts, to his purchaser; Mary's v. Anderson, 24 Pa. 272. If the sale is by the reversioner himself, and the rent is not reserved, all the instalments of it falling due
afterwards, pass with the land to the
grantee. Johnston v. Smith, 3 P. & W. 496;
Evans v. Hamrick, 61 Pa. 19.

This result is not affected by the brevity
of the interval between the conveyance
and the day on which the first instalment
of rent falls due. In Bank of Penna.
supra, a semi-annual instalment of $212.50
was payable to the purchaser, although
his purchase preceded by only 14 days the
day of payment. In Mary's v. Anderson,
24 Pa. 272, it was tacitly assumed, the lease
running for a year from April 1, 1848, that
a conveyance on March 31, 1849, would
have carried to the purchaser the right to
the rent for the year, had a contrary intention not been manifested.
The contract of lease was made between
Nichols and Jefferson, and it seems anomalous that the action for the rent may not
be maintained upon this contract, by the
lessor. Unless he reserves the rent, however, he passes to his alienee the right to
sue for the rent. No such right remains
in him. 12 Am. and Eng. Encyc. 754.
The judgment of non-suit was therefore
properly entered, and the motion to take
it off is overruled.

